Image and imagery in imaginal psychology (mental image and theory of science) by Vrbata, Ales
IMAGE AND IMAGERY IN IMAGINAL PSYCHOLOGY1
(MENTAL IMAGE AND THEORY OF SCIENCE)
Ales Vrbata2
ABSTRACT: This paper deals with theoretical concepts 
of image and imagery in foremost imaginal psychologists 
(James Hillman, Michael Vannoy Adams). Attributing 
primary epistemological status to image and imagery, 
archetypal/imaginal psychology school developed (both 
within philosophy and psychology) new theory of image 
and imagery, questioned older thesis about derivative and 
secondary epistemological status of image (image as imprint 
within human psyche, derivative of primary sensations). 
Using Jung’s concept of autonomous psyche of essentially 
archetypal nature, Hillman started to question Jung’s concept 
of “Self ” as the central archetype that — for him — symbolized 
sort of disguised traditional monotheism (Christian God, 
Jewish Yahweh etc.) similarly to Freud’s sexuality (id) or 
central cultural myth (Oedipus myth). Archetypal/imaginal 
psychology defends essential sovereignty and equality of all 
images (liberty to imagine considers as the first and the most 
important liberty of human being) and imagery and resultant 
polytheist psychology. Such direction that took place within 
Jungian Studies and give birth to imaginal psychology 
coincided with the development in different fields: in 
philosophy and theory of science. Derrida’s and Feyerabend’s 
rejection of ultimate referential frame is not identical with but 
parallels Hillman’s and Vannoy Adam’s discovery of fantasy 
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rules of the psyche. This paper also discusses similarities and 
differences in Hillman and Feyerabend and their concepts 
of paradigmatical cultural shift from culture and science 
dominated by “monotheist psychology” to that dominated by 
“polytheist psychology” where all images are treated equally.
KEYWORDS: Mental Image(s); Reality; Epistemology; J. 
Hillman; M. V. Adams; Post-Jungians; Feyerabend; Theory 
of Science.
RESUMO: O seguinte artigo trata dos conceitos teóricos da 
imagem e da imaginação em psicólogos preeminentes da 
imaginação (James Hillman, Michael Vannoy Adams, Rafael 
López Pedraza). Atribuindo a primazia epistemológica a 
imagem e a imaginação, a escola da psicologia arquetípica 
desenvolveu a nova teoria da imagem e da imaginação, 
questionou a tese mais velha da natureza derivada e secundária 
do estatuto epistemológico da imagem (como impressao na 
psique humana, o derivado das sensações primárias). Usando 
o conceito da psique como entidade autonóma e de essencia 
arquetipal do C. G. Jung, Hillman começou a questionar o 
conceito de “Self ” como o arquetipo central que — no seu 
entender — simbolizou certa camulfagem do monoteismo 
tradicional (Deus cristão, Javé judeu etc.) semelhante à 
sexualidade freudiana (id) ou ao mito central cultural (mito de 
Édipo). A psicologia arquetipal sustenta a soberania essencial 
de todas as imagens (liberdade de imaginar considera a 
primeira e a mais importante liberdade do ser humano), a 
imaginação e a psicologia poli-teista dela decorrente. Uma 
atitude assim evoca muitas questoes nao só no campo da 
psicologia (quanto individual tanto coletiva) mas também 
dentro da filosofia/teoria da ciencia ou epistemologia.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Imagem Mental; Realidade; Epistemologia; 
J. Hillman; M. V. Adams; Pós-Junguianos; Feyerabend; Teoria 
da Ciência.
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“The psyche creates reality everyday,” Jung says. “The 
only expression I can use for this activity is fantasy”. If, as 
Jung succinctly says, “image is psyche” and if the psyche 
creates reality, then what creates reality is the image.
Michael Vannoy Adams
Today we know that imagery has the same importance or 
even more importance than other fundamental mental 
functions of human personality. Paul Kugler, for example, 
locates imagination in the basis of human self-consciousness, 
speaking, memory, dreaming, writing etc. Without that no 
art, no science or culture would be possible, and, certainly, 
there would be no humanness (KLUGER, 2008, p. 85). 
Nevertheless, during almost all the history of the West human 
imagery was considered epiphenomenon, sort of derivative 
and unessential secondary product of human mind. Starting 
with tradition of western epistemology (Plato) imaginary and 
image were considered misleading, vague entity, source of 
misunderstanding, vagueness, uncertainty, confusion. But 
imagery makes part of human nature and surely plays its role 
not just in subjective but also in external world of man. Taking 
imagery seriously is quite contemporary phenomena. Omitted 
and ignored by scientific disciplines, imagery was frequently 
restricted to art, religion, eventually to “pseudoscientific 
disciplines”. Tradition of western philosophy and suspicious 
attitude to imagery overlap almost from the very start of that 
tradition. Ironically, it was German rationalist philosopher 
Immanuel Kant, who initiated great liberating process 
of human imagery from its subjugation to rationality. 
His einbildungskraft and after him European romanticist 
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movement finally led to admitting imagination its legitimate 
status both in human psyche, psycho-logy and in epistemology. 
In following lines I shortly expound principle of rationality 
and material reality as an epistemological principle dominating 
for most part of Western history of ideas whose unshakable 
status started trembling already during 18th century with 
David Hume and Immanuel Kant. Nevertheles, vis-à-vis 
industrial revolution and technological progress neither 
romanticist cultural revolution nor German Naturphilosophie3 
did supersede rationalist, progressist and technological vein of 
the 19th century (ELLENBERGER, 1970, p. 224-228). Sigmund 
Freud’s psychoanalysis — considering unconscious merely 
derivate of conscious ego and inspired by natural sciences 
— remained faithful to what we could call reality principle 
and fantasy and that is why it viewed imagination with 
considerable suspicion. Jung, contrary to Freud, conceded 
to unconscious autonomy, independence, knowledge, and 
creativity which drew him nearer to German romanticist 
philosophers and to the idea that psyche is composed of images. 
Similarly to today’s post-Jungians he also referred to European 
romanticism and to Christian as well as pre-Christian thinkers 
who had valued spontaneously emerging mental images.
Different attitudes of Freud and Jung can be attributed to their 
different personalities but to their different relation to philosophy 
as well. Even though Jung had love-hate relationship with 
philosophy4 already as youth had became completely absorbed 
in history of ideas whereas Freud deliberately avoided reading 
philosophical texts (KLUGER, 2008, p. 85). In introductory pages 
of Psychological Types (1921) Jung presented quite extensive 
commentary to western history of ideas. Philosophically Jung 
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considered himself Kantian thinker — whereas Freud considered 
mental images representations of instincts, Jung conceived 
them as primary phenomena of autonomous psyche, i.e. entities 
similar to Kant’s a priori structures (time, space, number etc.).5 
But Kantian subject could not envisage collective unconscious 
or unconscious processes. Here the missing link between 
Kant and Jung offer German romanticists, naturphilosophie or 
Arthur Schopenhauer. While Jung did not refer to Hegel,6 he 
did so very often to Hegel´s rival Schopenhauer. It seems that 
it is just Schopenhauerian influence that overarches Kantian 
(Enlightened) and Freudian (psychoanalytic) influence in Jung. 
It could be even said that Schopenhauer was that kindred kind 
of philosopher who fits into Jung’s idea of philosophy and 
philosophizing sufficiently bonded with life itself. Moreover, if we 
take into consideration that Jung was one of those few thinkers 
exceptionaly imaginal and pictorial in their cognitive processing, 
he certainly found in Schopenhauer important ally. Schopenhauer 
was one of those few philosophers who paid attention to dreams, 
mental images and imagery. The very title of Schopenhauer’s 
masterpiece Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (The World as 
Will and Idea) from 1819 reveals how much attention he paid 
to human imagery. “Vorstellung” is sometimes translated as 
“idea” but literally means “placed before” and better could be 
translated as “representation”.7 By “vorstellung” Schopenhauer 
means phenomena, representations emerging from unconscious 
and identified or intuited as images. Whatever philosophical 
concept or work of art is preceded by mental images. As writer 
Schopenhauer repeatedly used his mental images and imagery 
— just like Jung. According to Schopenhauer both for artist and 
philosopher imagery is in-between that could enlarge subjective 
consciousness beyond particular objects or images to “timeless 
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subjects of knowing” (1958, p. 199): Urbilder or Musterbilder, 
“prototypes” or “archetypes”. In this Schopenhauer is Platonic 
philosopher (after all not just once referred to “divine Plato”). 
Schopenhauer was one of those thinkers who intuited existence 
of unconscious dimension of human subjectivity. Together 
with romanticist pioneers of depth psychology (C.G.Carus, G. 
H. von Schubert, I.G.V. Troxler, G.T.Fechner or J. J. Bachofen) 
and romanticist artists were also one of great de-constructors of 
enlightened subject: “Locke goes too far in denying all innate truths 
inasmuch as he extends his denial even to our formal knowledge 
— a point in which he has been brilliantly rectified by Kant …”.8
Jung’s psychology is an example of synthesis of Enlightened 
(rationalist) and romanticist (irationalist) tradition. Even though 
Jungian archetype can be similar to innate ideas, Jung highlights 
that archetypes equate innate ideas. These are forms, non-
actualized potentialities of ideas and images, that must be first 
actualized by means of experience. According to Jung archetypes 
can be understood as “innate possibilities of ideas”, they are 
“similar to the Kantian categories”: “give definitive form to contents 
of themselves, they give definitive form to contents that have 
already been acquired” by means of experience (1970b, p. 10-11).
BEYOND REFERENTIALITY: KANT, DERRIDA, JUNG
As it was suggested above, Kant was linear ancestor 
of Jung’s structuralist concept. Confronted with Hume’s 
arbitrary fictionalism, in the first edition of Die Kritik der 
Reinen Vernunft Kant emphasized autonomous nature of 
human mind in the cognition process: reason and perceptions 
are produced by imagery (Einbildungskraft). Till then mental 
imagery was conceived as 1) reproductive and 2) located in 
conscious. Conceiving mental images as primary creative 
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phenomena of human mind and placing synthetic a priori 
categories beyond human reason, Kant revolutionized both 
relation between reason and mental imaging and approach to 
process cognition and thinking. Shortly, imaging is necessary 
precondition of all the knowledge. Kant’s liberation of image 
was later exploited by new romanticist movements in differents 
parts of Europe and later, in the beginning of 20th century, 
Sigmund Freud immersed himself to the study of fantasies, 
dreams and associations. In Freud notion of “human subject” 
spanned till then merely intuited dimension. It was not 
until Jung discovered autonomous dimension of psyche and 
its images as the source of human experiences. Its capacity 
to produce images started to be considered intermediary 
between ego-consciousness and the world of outer and inner 
objects. Thus mental imaging got completely new role and 
changed also concept of so-called reality. It does not rest in 
Platonic eternal ideas, transcendent divinity or matter any 
more. Reality became function of psychic imaging. Thus, 
human life consists in psychic images, and experience of 
reality results from psyche’s capacity to produce images.
The psyche creates reality every day. The only expression 
I can use for this activity is fantasy … Fantasy, 
therefore, seems to me the clearest expression of the 
specific activity of the psyche. It is, pre-eminently 
…[a] creative activity. (JUNG, 1970a, p. 51-52).
 
Experiencing inner and outer world takes place in images 
whose source transcends conscious psyche. “Reality” thus got 
paradoxical quality. First, it resulted from psyche’s capacity to 
produce images, secondly, imagery became place of origin of 
meaning (whereas during most part of Western philosophy 
tradition the ontological status of imagery was derivative).
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Approximately in the middle of the 20th century post-
modern critique of Western epistemology was introduced in 
continental philosophy. Then Foucault and Derrida focused on 
the old problem of fundamental platform of act of intepretation. 
In other words they opened old question of metaphysical 
background of act of interpretation. Ancient and medieval 
philosophy understood universals as referring to ultimate 
transcendent reality. Much like reproductive theory of images 
referred to transcendent/metaphysical idea/form/archetype. 
Reproductive theory of image was fundamentally shaken by 
Hume who led it ad abdurdum, thus removed all metaphysical 
scaffolding and exposed it to epistemological solipsism. 
Derrida did something similar with the language: started 
questioning reproductive concept of language and removed 
its reference to ultimate/transcendent “reality” whatosoever. 
If Hume inquired for “reality” behind inner and outer 
images, Derrida inquired for “reality” behind language. Like 
that medieval dispute between realism (referrential models 
of “reality”) and nominalism (there are no universals) was 
renewed. With Derrida, post-modern inheritor of medieval 
nominalists, it became evident that if we withdraw from 
supposed referentiality (reproductivity) of words, we cannot go 
behind text and so find ourselves in solipsism. Derrida’s text is 
solipsist text and is analogous to Hume’s arbitrary fictionalism: 
Derrida’s post-modern deconstruction does not refer to 
ultimate meaning as well as Hume’s arbitrary fictionalism.
Hume’s epistemological scepticism led Kant to radical 
change of perspective. Kant left extreme assumptions 
(referentiality and fictionalism) and overarched them by means 
of his transcendetalism. Leaving traditional perspective of the 
Western epistemology (referentialism: our mode of cognition 
must conform to object of experience), Kant introduced 
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extra-conscious platfom9 of human psyche (innate a priori 
categories) which makes all human experience possible and 
which is universal (empirical rules could not guarantee 
universality). Together with such epistemological model Kant 
introduced two modes of knowledge: 1) things as phenomena 
(experienced) and 2) things as noumena (things as they are in 
themselves, inacessible to our knowledge). In fact, concept of 
noumena was posited only negatively to set limits of human 
reason. Although Kant did not use concept of conscious and 
unconscious mind, Jung’s extended delicate implications 
of Kritik der reinen Vernunft and applied it to his model 
(archetypes conceived as a priori categories of human psyche). 
In Jung Kantian a priori categories became “innate possibilities 
of ideas” that are “similar to Kantian ideas”. However, Jung 
stressed that archetype understood neither as idea nor as 
image but as a disposition to certain images and ideas and 
clearly discerned between archetype and archetypal image. 
Whereas archetype in itself is somehow unknowable core that 
“never was conscious and never will be ... it was, and still is, only 
interpreted” (JUNG, 1970d, p. 266), archetypal representations 
(i.e. images and ideas) are “mediated as by the unconscious 
should not be confused with the archetype as such. They are 
very varied ... and point back to one essential “irrepresentable” 
basic form. The latter is characterised by certain formal 
elements and by certain fundamental meanings, although these 
can only be grasped approximately” (JUNG, 1970c, p. 25).
Concept of archetype an sich as it was posited in 1940s 
attracted attenttion because it gave psychology fundamental 
status similar to that of biology, neorology and other disciplines. 
As a consequence, in post-war period number of experts 
started dealing with analogies between Jungian archetypal 
theory and other disciplines’ theories (SAMUELS, 1985, p. 
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26-43). Meanwhile inf luenced by post-Freudian revisions and 
critiques, psychoanalysis started coming to the conclusion, 
that positions of Jungian school and psychoanalysis converge.10
BEYOND STRUCTURAL CONCEPT OF PSYCHE
Today´s post-Jungians embrace Jung as structuralist (ADAMS, 
2004c, p. 41-56; KLUGER, 2008, p. 77-91; SHAMDASANI, 
2003) and as it was stated above, they often underscore that Jung 
anticipated convergency of analytical psychology and various 
Freudian schools of psychoanalysis, that took “structural theory” 
as one of their perspectives (ADAMS, 2004c, p. 41-56). Jungian 
tradition has its structural theory too. Jungian structural theory 
describes relations between “persona”, “ego”, “shadow”, “anima”, 
“animus” and “Self ”. Already during Jung’s life a question of 
structure or hierarchy of archetypes was intensely discussed. One 
of eminent Jungian psychologist Edward F. Edinger understands 
dynamics of psyche as produced by bi-polar nature of psyche: ego-
Self axis,11 other autors distinguish four types of archetypes: 1) 
“shallow” archetypes (persona and shadow), 2) “archetypes of sex”, 
3) “archetypes of spirit” (old wise man and crone) and finally 4) Self 
(SAMUELS, 1985 p. 31-32). Also bi-polarity of archetypes (ego/
self, conscious/unconscious, personal/collective, extraversion/
introversion, rational/irrational, Eros/Logos, image/instinct) 
seems to imply concept of archetypes and structuralist concept. 
In post-war period structural concepts enjoyed vast 
applications in social sciences and in psychoanalysis as well. 
At that time Jung’s followers and experts from different 
disciplines (biology, neurology, etc.) started looking for 
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common field of study that could enable grasp archetype and its 
manifestations in different disciplines as well. Within Jungian 
tradition itself critical distance towards Jung took place not 
until James Hillman’s Terry lectures at Yale University (1972) 
and his Re-Visioning Psychology (1975). Hillman started 
questioning structuralist perspective and assumed critical 
attitude to Jung. Andrew Samuel ś labelling “post-Jungian(s)” 
referes exactly to this attitude (till then unprecedented): “I 
have used the term post-Jungians in preference to Jungian to 
indicate both connectedness to Jung and distance from him” 
(1985 p. 19).12 Michael Vannoy Adams and Andrew Samuels 
exemplified that in Hillman’s approach to some of Jung’s own 
concepts. For example Samuels notes that in Hillman’s Re-
Visioning Psychology there is no entry for “self ” in the index: 
he “little says about the self ” (1985, p. 107). It seems to me, 
that it was probably the first step to break-up with structural 
perspective within Jungian psychology.13 But such a process 
was inevitably intertwined with the process of more radical 
liberating of image within Jungian field of study. Hillman’s 
attack upon what is called “ego-self axis” was not just attack 
upon idea of “privileged” or “superior” images, but also attack 
upon Platonic idea of hierarchy of archetypes/images and 
tendency to impose theoretic (including structural) concepts. 
It led Hillman to some objections towards contemporary 
psychology and its philosophical and cultural underpinnings.
DE-CENTRED — POLY-CENTRED — POLY-THEIST PSYCHE
Some have considered Jung´s most important discovery 
to be the psychological complex, others the archetype, but 
perhaps his main contribution lies not so much in these 
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ideas as in his radical, personified formulation of them. (...) 
whereas philosophers had conceived such forces as mental 
events, Jung described them as persons. Jung harked back 
to Renaissance, Hellenic, and archaic thought forms.
James Hillman
Hillman does not understand archetypes structuraly, 
does not order them in sort of hierarchy. Hillman himself 
(as well as Jung before him) speaks about “Self ” as about 
abstract concept imposed in psyche from without and 
to proceed in Re-Visioning he has to repudiate “dogma of 
self-domination” because Self literally gained control of 
Jungian psychology.14 According to Hillman theory of 
personality should start with dream and dream images15 
because human being is “primarily an imagemaker and 
our psychic substance consists of images; our being is 
imaginal being, an existence in imagination. We are indeed 
such stuff as dreams are made on” (HILLMAN, 1997, p. 
23). For Hillman Jung’s main contributions consist in 
his approach to mental images, i. e. in personification.16
Personification played very important role already in Freud. 
Paradoxically it was not “restored as a valid idea through classics 
or philosophy (...) but in the consulting room and the insane 
asylum” (HILLMAN, 1997, p. 17). It was psychopathology that 
led Freud and after him Jung to the idea of psyche´s propensity 
to personify. Hillman notes that Freud’s basic “structural 
notions” as the Censor, the Superego, the Primal Horde or the 
Primal Scene, concepts like Eros, Thanatos or Oidipus complex 
are in fact personifications. Nevertheless, for Hillman Freud’s 
psychoanalysis proved to be mere translation of one kind of 
images into another ones: ancient personified images were 
translated into another fantasy (this time formulated in so-
called objective and neutral language of numbers and structures 
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which was believed to be “objective” and “scientific”, i.e. non-
imaginal, non-mythological). In fact Freud’s psychoanalysis 
provided psyche with another scene for personifications and 
mythologizations. As a result, Freud’s psyche continues speaking 
in her own way about herself as it did in ancient times: “a 
mythic manner of speaking is fundamental to the soul’s way of 
formulating itself.” (HILLMAN, 1997, p. 20). Whereas Freud 
enacted new “psychoanalytic” mythology without being aware of 
that, Jung risked his reputation of scientist, took very innovating 
and dangerous step and “reverted courageously to the direct mode 
of personifying which in his day was still considered a primitive 
formulation” (HILLMAN, 1997, p. 21).17 Whereas philosophers 
before him described such psychic forces as mental phenomena, 
Jung resorted to archaic method — and personified them. 
Acceding to mythic manner of speaking Jung dared opening 
vast space or — perhaps better said — broader view of psyche. 
Personification became Jung’s fundamental method of approaching 
psyche. Working with word associations, active imagination, 
discovering autonomous autonomous complexes he started using 
personification as a method of approaching nature of psyche.
What is personification? It is a psychic process or “mode of 
thought” upon which anthropomorphism or animism rests, thus 
it forms basis of ancient mythologies, dreams, fantasies. Hillman 
defines it as “‘mode of thought’ which takes an inside event 
and puts it outside, at the same time making this content alive, 
personal, and even divine” (1997, p. 12). As stated above, Jung 
used it as a method of approaching psyche (not just modern white 
psyche of Europeans but also psyche of black Africans, Afro-
Americans or ancient psyche of pre-modern cultures of the world).
Nevertheless Jung approached psyche with certain 
philosophical presumptions which resulted from his neo-
Kantian position. It is likely that his philosophical presumptions 
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resulted from what Hillman calls “monotheist culture” of the 
West as well (1997, p. 168). According to Hillman majority of 
theoretical disciplines of the western thought is traditionally 
obsessed by unified models because modern psyche (including 
modern secularized psyche) comes out from monotheist 
tradition. Both Freud and Jung make part of it: “The monotheistic 
model may be overtly religious, as is Jung’s self, or disguised, 
as in Freud attempt at a comprehensive system. Organicism, 
holism, unified-field theory, monistic materialism, and other 
psychologies express their fundamental monism through 
insistence upon clarity, cohesion, or wholes” (1997, p. 35).
If Jung accepted psyche’s propensity to personify and thus 
got nearer to its mythological, imaginal basis. Hillman took step 
beyond Jung and firmly sticks on the image as a fundamental 
product of psyche. His programmatic motto “stick to the image” 
leads him to radical de-construction and de-monotheization 
of psyche. If we deprive psyche of strict monopoly of rational 
ego, we enter the vast space of polycentrism, i.e. number of 
images that — according to Hillman — should be neither 
hierarchized nor structured. Even ego-complex Hillman 
considers ego-image — one of many other mental images. 
In this way Hillman de-centralizes (that is de-structures 
or de-constructs) psyche and opens the new perspective 
that enables us to view “lower layers of psyche”18 (archaic, 
mythological, polycentric layers of psyche): “Myth offers the 
same kind of world. It too is polycentric, with innumerable 
personifications in imaginal space. Just as dream images are 
not mere worlds in disguise (...) so the ancient personifications 
of myths are not concepts in disguise.” (1997, p. 33-34).
Hillman is aware of extremity of his perspective, he even 
admits that majority of psychology schools must view it as 
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pathological: “this movement of consciousness into psychological 
reality is experienced at first as pathological; things fall apart 
as the one becomes many. Recognition of the multiple persons 
of the psyche is akin to the experience of multiple personality. 
Personifying means polycentrity, implicating us in a revolution of 
consciousness — from monotheistic to polytheistic” (1997, p. 35).
This shift has also other consequences which I am going 
to deal with further in the paper. For Hillman archetypal 
perspective (or soul-making perspective) is the same as poly-
theist perspective — not in the theological sense but such a 
perspective enables get accross diversity of the soul, refuses 
monotheist prejudice (that dominates our habitual everyday 
psychology) and implies radical relativism. In this spirit is all 
his book Re-Visioning of Psychology: de-literalizing and on the 
contrary figuratization of reality. In other words put an end to 
reality principle and substitute it with fantasy principle or as 
Vannoy Adams says, make Mr. Reality up for Mr.Fantasy (2004a).
Thus, Hillman already in 1970s proposed post-structural 
Jungian theory. It was natural consequence of his programmatic 
motto “stick to the image” and another revolutionary step in 
liberating images within modern western psyche. In one of 
his latest works Michael Vannoy Adams defends imaginal/
post-Jungian psychology leaving behind post-structural 
perspective: “Does Jungian analysis need a structural theory? 
Or can it do very well without one? I maintain that there 
is little to be lost and much to be gained if Jungian analysis 
dispenses entirely with the structural theory of the persona, 
ego, shadow, anima or animus, and Self — and relies intead 
on a post-structural theory.” (2004c, p. 40). Today, 60 years 
after Jung’s death, it seems that “Hillmanian perspective” 
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views psyche as an with natural propensity to personify, to 
mythologize and to produce images. At the same time they 
believe that psyche tends to divide in many parts and images.
ENSOULED WORLD AND THEORY OF SCIENCE
William James says that the distinction between pluralism 
and monism is “the most pregnant of all dilemmas of 
philosophy”. James asks: “Does reality exist distributively 
? or collectively ? — in the shapes of eaches, everys, 
anys, eithers ? Or only in the shape of an all or whole ?”
Michael Vannoy Adams 
Hillman refuses imposition of psychologico-philosophical 
pre-conceptions on human psyche. Already above exposed 
Hillman’s perspectives and positions makes him to protest 
against invasive conduct of psychology toward what he calls 
world, soul or, better, ensouled world. For him it was mechanicist 
and rationalist dogmatizer Descartes who “banished the 
psyche at the beginning of our modern period” (1997, p. 10):
Also basic to this modern view of persons is the psychology 
of Descartes; it imagines a universe divided into living 
subjects and dead objects. There is no space for anything 
intermediate, ambiguous, and metaphorical. (...) This is a 
restrictive perspective (...). Psychology, whose very name 
and title derives from soul, (psyché), has stopped soul from 
appearing in any place but where it sanctioned by this 
modern world view. Just as modern science and metaphysics 
have banned the subjectivity of souls from the outer world 
of material events, psychology has denied the autonomy 
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and diversity of souls to the inner world of psychological 
events. Intentions, behaviour, voices, feelings that I do not 
control with my will or cannot connect to with my reason 
are alien, negative, psychopathological. All my subjectivity 
and all my interiority must be literally mine, in ownership 
of my conscious ego-personality. At best we have souls; 
but no one says we are souls. Psychology does not even 
use the word soul: a person is referred to as a self or an 
ego. But the world out there and in here have gone through 
the same proces sof personification. We have all been de-
souled. (...) And so we must free the vision of the psyche 
from the narrow biases of modern psychology, enabling 
the psyche to perceive itself — its relations, its realities, its 
pathologies — altogether apart from psychology’s modern 
perspective. The modern vision of ourselves has stultified 
our imaginations. It has fixed our view of personality 
(psychology), of insanity (psychopathology), of matter 
and objects (science), of the cosmos (metaphysics), and 
of the nature of the divine (theology). Moreover it has 
fixed the methods in all these fields so that they present 
a unified front against soul. Some people in desperation 
have turned to witchcraft, magic and occultism, to 
drugs and madness, anything to rekindle imagination 
and find a world ensouled. But these reactions are not 
enough. What is needed is a revisioning, a fundamental 
shift of perspective out of that soulless predicament we 
call modern consciousness. (HILLMAN, 1997, p. 1-3).
Hillman´s demand of “fundamental shift of perspective” 
has, of course, its profound philosophical implications and 
echoes development in the area of theory/philosophy of science 
during the second half of the 20th century. Although Kuhn, 
Feyerabend, Bohm, Capra, or even Grof were not “champions 
of psyche” (as some of Hillman’s sympathizers call him) and 
did not share Hillman’s desirable perspective (soul-making)19 
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they — from different perspectives but with similar arguments 
— argued against Newton-Cartesian paradigm as well, and 
opened the way to its overcoming or substitution. Supported 
by different currents of philosophy and foundings in different 
disciplines, in 1960s and 1970s post-Jungians seemed to stand 
on the threshold of a new chapter in the history of science.
Modern philosophy started discovering “objectivity 
problem” (“objective truth” problem) in science already at the 
turn of 19th and 20th century when many scientific theories were 
discredited.20 Such situation led to refutation of then widely 
accepted idea of science permanently separated from philosophy. 
Such tendencies encouraged already existing strong irrationalist 
and un-scientific/un-objectivist current in philosophy.21 
Irrationalism of the 19th century responded to classical physics 
(based on Newton’s celestial mechanics and Eucleidian 
geometry) whose foundations were entering process of crisis.22 
Moreover, the principle of illustration started to disappear — 
shift from mechanicist concepts to quantum-relativist ones, 
study of subatomic cosmos, elementary particles, discovery of 
different levels of physical world with their own laws; all that 
made early 20th century science extremely abstract enterprise 
with big portion of human/subjective factor: imaginary! Idea 
of science permanently separated from philosophy had to 
be discarded and scientists started studying philosophical 
premises of their works. Subjectivist philosophers — Émile 
Boutroux for example — stressed human origin of natural laws 
and rejected idea of their absolute validity. After the World War 
II — with the the birth of historical school of philosophy of 
science (HOLZBACHOVÁ, 1996, p. 73) — a positivist notion 
of science was refused. It seems that it was Kuhn’s Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions (1962) that marked definitive coup de 
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grâce to Newton-Cartesian tradition of Western rationality 
and accumulative notion of science. After Kuhn the problem 
of ultimate and “objective” truth was further relativized. 
Radical relavist and author of ground-breaking works, Paul K. 
Feyerabend in 1970s and 1980s reprezented radical extension 
of Kuhn’s theses. Feyerabend was probably aware — in Against 
Method (1975), Science in a Free Society (1978) and Farewell to 
Reason (1987) — of his extremely radical position. In my view, 
his ground-breaking works were supposed to destroy “dogma 
of rational/positivist/scientific God” or to demythize Western 
rationality and its institutions which paralleled Hillmanian 
destruction of “dogma of self-domination” as it was exposed 
in Re-Visioning published the same year. Those operations 
led to opening of unexpected free space and cross-science 
influence, wide theorizing about mutual influences science-
society and even idea of science as plural or disunited entity:
Philosophers then concluded that the various forms of 
rationalism that had offered their services had not only 
produced chimaeras but would have damaged the sciences 
had they been adopted as guides. Here Kuhń s masterpiece 
played a decisive role. It led to new ideas. Unfortunately 
it also encouraged a lot of trash. Kuhń s main terms 
(‘paradigm’, ‘revolution’, ‘normal science’, ‘prescience’, 
‘anomaly’,  puzzle-solving’, etc.) turned up in various 
forms of pseudoscience while his general approach 
confused many writers: finding that science had been 
freed from the fetters of a dogmatic logic and epistemology 
they tried to tie it down again, this time with sociological 
ropes. That trend lasted well into the early seventies. (...) In 
sociology the attention to detail has led to a situation where 
the problem is no longer why and how ‘science’ changes 
but how it keeps together. Philosophers, philosophers 
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of biology especially, suspected for some time that there 
is not one entity ‘science’ with clearly defined principles 
but that science contains a great variety of (high-level 
theoretical, phenomenological, experimental) approaches 
and that even a particular science such as physics is but 
a scattered collection of subjects (...) each of containing 
contrary tendencies (...). For some authors this is not only 
a fact; it is also desirable. (FEYERABEND, 1993, p. x-xi).
Feyerabend was probably the most radical critic of previous 
philosophy of science whatsoever. In fact he radicalized Kuhn’s 
basic categories, untied theory of science from its previous 
rationalistic tradition, insisted on methodological freedom 
and used Kuhn’s concept of “incommensurability” in favour 
of peaceful coexistence of different scientific/pseudoscientific 
traditions within free society. Rejection of demarcation problem 
and acceptation of different scientific traditions as equal 
important as academic science may seem to make Feyerabend 
kindred spirit of Hillman’s polytheist psychology. But it can 
be question of Zeitgeist as well: Feyerabend’s theory of science 
and Hillman’s imaginal psychology originated at the same time 
and thus are imprint of that time. Even if there are considerable 
similarities23 (call for “fundamental shift of perspective”, 
Hillman’s liberty to imagine as fundamental human liberty 
and Feyerabend’s liberty to think within whatever scientific 
tradition), there are also considerable differences. Whereas 
Feyerabend is (regarding knowledge and its standing in 
society) radical democrat or egalitarian and anarchist (as far 
as scientific method is concerned), Hillman is firmly rooted in 
Jungian tradition, empirist and imagist following autonomy 
of psyche. Moreover, Feyerabend could not follow Hillmanian 
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soul-making perspective. There is also difference in the view 
at Western philosophical/scientific tradition which Hillman 
divides into two big counter-cultures according to their approach 
to images.24 And finally Feyerabend believes in scientific 
progress (even if not in positivist sense as a accumulation of 
findings but as a permanent shift from one paradigm to another 
one) whereas Hillmanian “progress” takes form of Jungian 
circumambulatio, i.e. form of circle, repeated and “eternal” 
walking around primary datas produced by unconscious, i.e. 
mental images, walking around the same/similar motives (in 
dreams, visions, associations, everyday situations) and like that 
engage conscious personality with its unconscious counterpart. 
Because psyche is made primarily of images and not of intellectual 
concepts, Hillman does not look for intellectual certainty but 
works with metaphors, ambiguity, fictions, does not believe 
intellectual constructions a does not look for. However as he 
himself states, such posture has its intellectual justification:
Les us recall here what Paul Ricoeur said in his Terry 
Lectures: ‘Enigma does not block understanding but 
provokes it ...That which arouses understanding is 
precisely the double meaning, the intending of second 
meaning in and through the first’. Moreover we have at 
our side in this stance against definition a responsible 
rationalist, Karl Popper, who writes that ‘outside 
mathematics and logic problems of definability are 
mostly gratuitous. We need many undefined terms whose 
meaning ... will be changeable. But this is so with all 
concepts, including defined ones, since a definition can 
only reduce the meaning of the defined term to that of the 
undefined terms.’ And ‘...all definitions must ultimately 
go back to undefined terms’. Perhaps our recourse to 
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ignotum per ignotius is no mere mercurial trick of the 
alchemist, no mystification at all, but has indeed its 
intellectual justification (HILLMAN, 1997, p.152-153).
 
Imaginal psychology operates on completely different terrain 
and progress or “expansion” understands just as an “expansion of 
consciousness” taking place on ego-unconscious axis, i.e. as a result 
of conscious-unconscious dialogue. That is a work — as Himself 
says — that takes place behind scientific and intellectual concepts 
and definitions. That is what he calls “seeing through” intellect:
The infinite regress of psychologizing, its interiorizing 
process from visible to invisible which we have just 
described (...) — this infinite regress here comes to 
rest because here it meets the permanent ambiguity of 
metaphors (...). For these intellectual concepts, like all 
intellectual concepts, ‘rest’ or find ‘permanent ground’ 
and ‘base’ in metaphor and can only be ‘established’ 
by consent of metaphor. It is the imaginal that gives 
certainty to our intellectual sureties, augmenting the 
intellect the beyond itself (...) to connote and imply and 
suggest always more than its terms would denote. For 
the intellectual too expresses fantasies that are rooted 
in myths, and these fantasies can be exposed by the 
psychologizing eye of the soul. Nunquam enim satiatur 
oculus visu, said Cusanus. ‘The eye, as a sense organ is 
never satiated nor limited by anything visible; for the eye 
can never have too much of seeing; likewise, intellectual 
vision is never satisfied with of the truth ...The striving 
for the infinite, the inability to stop at anything given 
or attained is neither a fault nor a shortcoming of the 
mind; rather it is the seal of its divine origin and of 
its indestructibility’ (HILLMAN, 1997, p.153-154)
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Feyerabend would have certainly accepted all those archaic 
scientific systems, both ancient and modern oraculal techniques, 
theories and practices25 as equal to Western science. He does not 
speak about psychological transference or participation mystique 
in primitive mentality but aware of fragmented consicousness 
of Ancients (as expressed in their mythologies and religious 
life) and their live in plurality of different or inconsistent 
images was really human.26 After analyzing Homeric world 
Feyerabend argues in favour of plural, dis-united, fragmented, 
non-dogmatic, pluri-sided outer and inner world (or its image?) 
as he sees it in old Greek myths, religion, science and culture:
To sum-up: the archaic world is much less compact that 
the world that surrounds us, and it is also experienced as 
being less compact. Archaic man lacks ‘physical’ unity, 
his ‘body’ consists of a multitude of parts, limbs, surfaces, 
connections; and he lacks of ‘mental’ unity, his ‘mind’ is 
composed of variety of events, some of them not even 
‘mental’ in our sense, which either inhabit the body-
puppet as additional constituents or are brought into it 
from the outside. Events are not shaped by the individual, 
they are complex arrangement sof parts into which the 
body-puppet is inserted at the appropriate place. This is 
the world-view that emerges from an analysis of the formal 
features of ‘archaic’ art and Homeric poetry. (...). Further 
evidence for the conjecture can be obtained from an 
examination of ‘meta-attitudes’ such as general religious 
attitudes and ‘theories’ of (attitudes to) knowledge. For 
the lack of compatness just described reappears in the 
field of ideology. There is a tolerance in religious matters 
which later generations found morally and theoretically 
unacceptable (...). Archaic man is a religious eclectic 
eclectic, he does not object to foreign gods and myths, and 
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he adds them to the existing furniture of the world without 
any attempt at synthesis, or removal of contradictions. 
There are no priests, there is no dogma, there are no 
categorical statements about the gods, humans, the 
world. (This tolerance can still be found with the Ionian 
philosophers of nature who develop their ideas side by side 
with myth without trying to eliminate the latter.) There is 
no religious ‘morality’ in our sense, nor the gods abstract 
embodiments of eternal principles. (...) This is how life 
was dehumanited by what some people are pleased to call 
“moral progress”or “scientific progress” (1993, p. 183-184).
Ellenberger touches the same question when writing about 
primitive psychotherapy and comparing between “primitive” and 
“scientific” medicine. In the table bellow there is basic classification 
of archaic diseases and their appropriate treatment (1970, p. 5).27
DISEASE THEORY THERAPY
1. Disease-object intrusion Extraction of disease-object
2. Loss of soul To find, bring back, and restore 
the lost soul
3. Spirit instrusion a) exorcism
b) mechanical extraction of the 
foreign spirit
c) transference of the foreign 
spirit into another living being
4. Breach of taboo Confession, propitiation
5. Sorcery Counter-magic
From different perspective and on the same terrain as 
Austrian-Californian Paul K. Feyerabend find themselves 
Czech-Californian psychologist of non-ordinary states of 
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consciousness Stanislav Grof28 or his colleague Richard Tarnas.29 
From the perspective of history of human consciousness Jung 
considers mono-theism necessary and difficult progression from 
polytheism and polydemonism. Jung supposes that whatever 
(conscious) striving for mono-theism (religious, scientific etc.) 
automatically generates response on the other (unconscious and 
poly-theist) pole. Supposing that such dynamics works both on 
individual and collective level, postmodern stress on multiplicity 
and relativity should be understood as a psychologico-cultural 
reaction to longlasting mono-theist, one-sided conscious attitudes 
of Western societies across centuries. Even if we suppose that on 
fundamental level (unity of opposites: coniunctio oppositorum) 
unity and multiplicity are indiscernible, post-Jungians 
consider psychological monotheism as utterly untenable:
If I am a “theist” at all, I am a “polytheist” — but 
only in the strictly psychological sense that Hillman 
employs the term. (...) I prefer the many-sidedness 
of polytheism to the one-sidedness of monotheism. 
This preference is not, however, simply a subjective 
predilection. I have what I regard as an objective basis 
for this preference. Because of the obvious, intrinsic 
diversity of the unconscious, monotheism seems to me 
utterly untenable psychologically. In my experience as a 
psychoanalyst, all of the evidence available to me from 
dreams, fantasies, and other material of my patients 
demonstrates conclusively that the psyche is not monistic 
but, as Samuel says, “plural” (ADAMS, 2004d, p. 217-218).
NOTAS
1In this paper I follow two prominent imaginal psychologists and prefer term 
“imaginal psychology” to “archetypal psychology”. Although Hillman himself 
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started using term “archetypal psychology” in 1970, five years later (in Re-
visioning Psychology) espoused term “imaginal psychology” and declared 
himself imagist. M. Vannoy Adams justifies use of this term in these words: 
“What is distinctive about Jungian psychology, especially in the Hillmanian 
rendition of it, is that it is an imaginal psychology. Jungian psychology is as 
much a psychology of the imagination as it is a psychology of the unconscious. 
Hillman even says: ‘I tend to use ‘imagination’ instead of that word ‘unconscious’ 
... not that there isn’t unconsciousness in us all the time”. (ADAMS, 2004a, p. 
1-19).
2E-mail: lesvrbata@hotmail.com.
3Henri Ellenberger considers founder of that philosophical current F.W. 
Schelling. Starting point of his philosophy is the assumption of fundamental 
identity of spiritual and material nature (both nature and spirit emerge from 
the same absolute and indissoluble unity: “Nature is visible Spirit, Spirit is 
invisible Nature”). Thus nature cannot be understood in terms of mechanical, 
determinist and physical concepts, but as an expression of profound spiritual 
laws and common spiritual principle (world soul: Weltseele). Quoting 
Leibbrand Ellenberger considers Schelling as a direct precursor of Jung 
(“C.G. Jung teachings in the field of psychology are not intelligible if they are 
not connected with Schelling”). Another inspirator of romanticist psychology 
was J.W.Goethe and his concepts of Urphänomene, All-Sinn etc. indicating 
profound (unconscious) unity of the world and man. Concept of Urphänomene 
is present not just in Jung (for instance animus and anima can be understood as 
embodiment of Goethe’s urphänomene), but also in Freud (thesis of primordial 
patricide). (ELLENBERGER, 1970, p. 202-205).
4Such relation to philosophy Jung maintained all his life, however, in fact it 
had much more to do with his relation to/with philosophers that philosophy 
itself. In my view it can be explained just by referring to big degree of 
misunderstanding that he felt in communication with philosophers. Jarrett 
interprets such misunderstandings in following terms: “When the philosophers 
indulged in verbal acrobatics and logic-chopping, when their speculations cut 
loose from moorings of experience, he would cry out, ‘I’am not philosopher, I’am 
an empiricist, a phenomenologist’” (JARRET, 1981, p. 193-204). In another place 
Jung himself admits high degree of misunderstanding with philosophers: “I 
must confess that I am always faced with a difficulty when I discuss (the subject of 
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Good and Evil) with philosophers or theologians. I have the impression that they 
are not talking about subject-matter itself but only about words, about concepts 
that mean or indicate it. We allow ourselves so easily to be dazzled by words, we 
substitute words for the whole of reality.” (JUNG, 1960, p. 91-99).
5Kant anticipated Jung in various respects. His a priori ordering of psyche 
anticipates Jung’s archetypes. At the beginning Kant differentiated between 
pure and empirical knowledge. He asserted that all knowledge starts with 
experience, but it is not derived from it (as was asserted by Locke). On the 
contrary, pure knowledge was supposed to rest in universal a priori notions 
(called categories as for example causality. According to Kant such an a priori 
law must be universal and not deduced from experience). In Jung’s model of 
psyche, archetypes (initially used term “primordial images”) determine our 
experience (“inborn disposition”, “dominants of experience”, “forms in which 
things can be perceived and conceived”) elementary structures of psyche. 
Nevertheless, Jung defined archetypes in different place and in different way, 
thus this notion became source of confusions and misunderstanding. Post-
Jungian psychology considers both Jung’s and Freud’s philosophical starting 
points of neokantian structuralist (Freud’s phylogenetic “schemata” or 
phylogenetic “prototypes”) (SHAMDASANI, 2003, p. 69-70; ADAMS, 2008, 
p. 107-124).
6In B. Eckman’s words “Despite Jung´s personal antipathy to Hegel´s writing, 
Jungian thought´s ultimate aims and vision of the universe are actually much 
closer to Hegel than to Hegel´s writing, Jungian thought´s ultimate aims and 
vision of the universe are actually much closer to Hegel than to Kant, and find 
in Hegel´s thought a more fitting philosophical ally”. Philosophical alliance 
with Kant constitutes for Jungians some fundamental problems. Jung and 
Jungians base their psychologizing on Kantian epistelomogy which makes part 
of Enlightenment tradition (Kant’s differentiation of subjective and objective 
cognition, procedure that Jung denominated as participation mystique between 
knower and known). In this respect Jung follows Kant’s epistemology. But 
Kant’s bifurcation of subject and object brought about problem — opened gulf 
between living knowing subject and passive unanimated object/world. “Even 
God in Kant´s scheme is not capable of bursting through the boundaries and 
limitations of human thought (...) God in Kant´s thought functions not as subject 
but as object — and to this extent at least is not alive but dead!”. Eckmans pose 
the question: “If Jung’s conception of psychoid archetypes overcomes the Kantian 
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bifurcation of subject and object, it fails to address another dichotomy remaining 
in Jungian thought, the split between the conscious and the unconscious psyche. 
Might this remaining vestige of ‘Enlightened’ dualism be overcome?” Jung as 
well as Hegelians urge us beyond “Enlightened” epistemological concepts into 
authentic relation with extra-human life and world. However Kantian position 
adopts Cartesian bifurcation of subject and object which is in contradiction 
to Jung’s thesis, that the only remedy of the modern spiritual problem is 
restoration of contact (communication) with profound sources of psychic life. 
Hegel’s philosophy strives for overcoming of Enlightenment subject-object 
concept without taking recourse to participation mystique. In this respect it is 
closer to Jung. B. Eckman (1986, p. 88-99).
7C.G. Jung discussed this question with R.C.F. Hull, translator of Schopenhauer’s 
work, in their correspondence (JARRET, 1981, p. 193-204).
8Both Jung and Schopenhauer admit that Locke was right in his attack on 
innate ideas. Within Locke´s philosophy idea is a mental representation of 
material reality and that is why they can be learned just from experience.
9Considering imagination and its role in cognitive process, Paul Kugler 
considers Kant heir and follower of Giordano Bruno: “Kant (...) established a 
new ground within the human mind, but transcendent to the knowing subject. 
Two hundred years earlier, a similar view of images had led to Bruno being burnt 
at the stake” (p. 84). In another place: “Bruno, a sixteenth-century hermetic 
philosopher, dramatically revised the traditional reproductive view of image by 
going so far as to suggest that human imaging was the source of the thought itself! 
This was, of course, an extremely radical idea at the time. For Bruno, imaging 
procedes and indeed creates reason” (KUNGLER, 2008, p. 81).
10“few responsible figures in psychoanalysis would be disturbed today if an analyst 
were to present views identical to Jung´s in 1913”. (ROAZEN, 1976, p. 272). A. 
Samuels notes that “(...) one can see that Jung had a remarkable capacity to 
intuit the themes and areas with which late twentieth-century and early twenty-
first-century psychology would be concerned: gender; race; nationalism; cultural 
analysis; the perseverance, reappearance, and socio-political power of religious 
mentality in an apparently irreligious epoch; the unending search for meaning ...” 
(2008, p. 4). Andrew Samuels also states twelve psychoanalytic topics where 
Jung can be seen as precursor of contemporary post-Freudian analysis (2008, 
p. 1-15).
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11Edward Edinger writes about ego-Self axis in introductory chapters of 
his book Ego and Archetype (1972); “The opposites constitute the most basic 
anatomy of the psyche. The flow of libido, or psychic energy, is generated by the 
polarization of opposites in the same way as electricity flows between the positive 
and negative poles of an electrical circuit (...). The opposites are truly the dynamo 
of the psyche.” (EDINGER, 1994, p. 11-12); Andrew Samuels proposes criticism 
of Jung’s fundamental oppositionalism (1985, p. 92-93).
12Noteworthy is the absence of agreement regarding unity or plurality 
of “Jungian school”. Moreover, it seems there is no agreement regarding 
classification of different Jungian schools (classical, archetypal, developmental, 
psychoanalytical) either. There is not even agreement regarding use of 
terminology (imaginal psychology, archetypal psychology). There were 
objections regarding use of term “Post-Jungian” coming from Edward F. 
Edinger (1991) and Joseph Henderson (SAMUELS, 1985, p. 19-20).
13Probably the second one was Hillman’s (and not just his because similar attacks 
did Giegerich and Fordham) attack to Erich Neumann’s concept of hero (as a 
archetypal metaphor for consciousness). For Neumann “ego-consciousness” 
has inevitably masculine features. Its development and growth is depends on 
its separation (without destroying the bond) from its feminine counterpart 
— Great Mother (but essentially, i. e. archetypally they are unseparable). 
Giegerich a Hillman viewed “heroic ego” as something inherently dangerous 
for imagination (too strong and dominant ego-heroic-image is threatening for 
plurality of other images) (SAMUELS, 1985, p. 78).
14“Another reason why Hillman considers the Self dispensable is that it is not 
just any concept. In Jungian psychology, the Self is the ‘concept of concepts’. The 
Self is the Concept with a capital ‘C’. It is God with a capital ‘G’. It is Yahweh 
with a capital ‘Y’. Jung says that ‘in the place of a jealous God’ Freud substituted 
sexuality, which ten assumed ‘the role of a deus absconditus, a hidden or concealed 
god’. According to Jung, however, ‘the psychological qualities of the two rationally 
commensurable opposites — Yahweh and sexuality — remained the same’ — 
only the name was different. Similarly, in the place of God Jung substitutes the 
Self, which is just as jealous as Yahweh. Just as for Freud sexuality is God, for 
Jung the Self is God by another name.” (ADAMS, 2006).
15“Because our psychic stuff is images, image-making is a via regia, a royal road to 
soul-making. The making of soul-stuff calls for dreaming, fantasying, imagining. 
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To live psychologically means to imagine things; to be in touch with soul means to 
live in sensuous connection with fantasy. To be in soul is to experience the fantasy 
in all realities and the basic reality of fantasy.” (HILLMAN, 1997, p. 23).
16“main contribution lies not so much in these ideas as in his radical, personified 
formulation of them” (HILLMAN, 1997, p. 20).
17Such an insight was probably natural consequence of 1) Jung’s personal 
philosophical stance apparent already at the time of his experiments with so-
called occult phenomena, 2) Jung’s work with psychotics and 3) Jung’s own 
descend into the underworld where his encountered vast host inhabitants of 
unconscious.
18For further reading recommend article by Michael Vannoy Adams (2004b).
19J. Hillman borrowed that term from romanticist poets (William Blake, John 
Keats): “From this perspective the human adventure is a wandering through the 
vale of the world for the sake of making soul. Our life is psychological, and the 
purpose of life is to make psyche o fit, to find connection between life and soul” 
(1997, p. ix).
20For further reading: (PEARCEY & THAXTON, 1994).
21Nietzsche (especially in Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen — in English translated 
as Unmodern Observation or Untimely Meditations — published in 1870s, and 
later The Gay Science) rejected history as science and opened the question of 
destructive side of study of it. O. Spengler (radical refusal of causal reading 
of history) criticized ideal of positivist science as extremely naive. Spengler 
even rejects notion of causality and replaces it with “fate”. The same criticism 
leads towards ideal of unified science and espouses idea according to which 
all knowledge is culturally conditioned. Although nazi made use — at least 
partially — of them, they were not neither nazi nor pre-nazi thinkers and both 
can be considered forerunners of postmodern thinking.
22I am referring to the development in mathematics and logics where non-
classical systems were introduced (Lobachevskian geometry) and Newton 
theory proved to be unsufficient to explain all phenomena (Maxwell’s theories, 
Heisenberg’s and Bohr’s discoveries, Einstein’s theories).
23“In the history of philosophy of modern times, his most marked opponent in this 
respect is thus probably Descartes” (HOYNINGEN-HUENE, 1994).
24Cultural split Hillman is talking about results from each tradition’s attitude 
to image and imagery: 1) medieval and modern nominalists (no referentiality, 
flatus vocis) and de-personifiers (no personifying, no allegorizing), 2) Plato, 
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platonists, neo-platonists, medieval realists (personifiers, allegorizers, 
romantics).
25Grof ’s holotropic breathwork (and thesis of holotropic consciousness), 
Sheldrake’s theory of morphic resonance, various astrological schools and 
theories (Hamburg school, Astrololocality astrology, theory of Huber’s method 
of Age Point, Cosmobiology, Astro-Carto-Graphy etc.), Tarnas’ archetypal 
astrology (cosmos is essentially archetypal), archetypal historiography, 
Chinese and Asclepian medicine (cure coming in the night with the dream), 
various forms of neopaganism etc.
26As aready noted Adolf Bastian, Lévy-Bruhl, Jung and ethnopsychology, ego 
of “primitive” is so week that it not only projects itself on the outer world but 
it is even identified with it. Like that they resemble children whose fylogenetic 
cousins they are. Human “primitives” have very week sense of self. They 
experience themselves as outer objects — by means of transference of inner 
contents to the screen of the outer world. Identifying himself with the outer 
world, “primitive” identifies himself with the whole world around him, with 
his enviroment, starry sky, sun, moon, rivers, storms, winds. Such a state 
Lévy-Bruhl denominated as “patricipation mystique”. Whereas ancient or 
prehistoric people identified themselves extensively with outer world, modern 
people on the contrary identify themeselves too much with their own ego. 
Participation mystique played important role in the birth of ancient sciences 
(GAUQUELIN, 1969).
27In the introduction Ellenberger charts discovery of primitive psychotherapy 
and work of German anthropologist Adolf Bastian (1826-1902) who 
experienced primitive healing personally in Guyana.
28Stanislav Grof (1931), pioneer on the field of study of non-ordinary states 
of consciousness (NOSC), inventor of “holotropic breathwork”, author 
of “holotropic consciousness” theory. Author of numerous books and 
experimentator who challenges paradigm of Newton-Cartesian paradigm in 
science.
29Richard Tarnas is autor of the excellent books Prometheus the Awakener. An 
Essay on the Archetypal Meaning of the Planet Uranus (1994), Passion of the 
Western Mind (1991) and Cosmos and Psyche: Intimations of a New World View 
(2006) who — together with S. Grof teaches at CIIS (California Instutute of 
Integral Studies).
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